Ngaire Woods
Ngaire Woods is Dean of the Blavatnik
School of Government and Director of the Global Economic Governance
Program at the University of Oxford.
OXFORD
– The past three weeks have given the world a stunning role reversal in
global governance. The United States, the world’s long-time leader in
forging international cooperation, has begun to express a unilateralist
creed, striking fear into the hearts of many countries worldwide. And
China, long reticent about multilateralism, has committed to upholding –
even leading – international cooperation.
Since his
inauguration in January, US President Donald Trump has effectively taken
a wrecking ball to America’s global role. He has withdrawn the US from
the Trans-Pacific Partnership and redrawn the parameters of negotiations
over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With regard to China, he has not
only threatened to impose tariffs, but also raised the possibility that
he will defy the “One China” policy that his predecessors, Republicans
and Democrats alike, have respected for decades.
Trump has also signed
executive orders to bar nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries
from entering the US and to build a wall on the border with Mexico,
among other things. And his team has drafted additional executive orders that will reduce or even terminate funding for international organizations and withdraw the US from multilateral treaties.
Chinese President Xi
Jinping’s recent rhetoric and behavior stands in stark contrast to
Trump’s. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, last month,
he asserted that multilateralism is critical to our collective future. In a statement
seemingly directed at the US, he continued, “We should honor promises
and abide by rules. One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit.”
He was even more pointed in criticizing the prospect of abandoning the
Paris climate agreement – as Trump has threatened to do.
Nonetheless, it is too early to assume that the Pax Americana that has prevailed for the last several decades is giving way to a Pax Sinica. Indeed, neither side’s position is that clear-cut.
On the US side,
Trump’s draft executive orders are not as draconian as their titles
suggest. “Auditing and Reducing Funding of International Organizations,”
for example, simply proposes a committee to review financing of
multilateral organizations.
That draft order
targets, first and foremost, organizations that give full membership to
the Palestinian Authority or the Palestine Liberation Organization. This
is not new: US federal legislation has long mandated a complete cutoff
of American financing to any United Nations agency in which Palestine is
a full member.
The draft order also
targets the International Criminal Court, to which the US currently
provides no funding, and peacekeeping operations, including operations
in southern Lebanon that protect the northern border of Israel, which
Trump seems keen to help. Finally, it calls for an assessment of
development aid to countries that oppose important US policies, though
the State Department, through which such aid is channeled, already
accounts for such considerations.
Moreover, there is
still plenty of time for Trump to adopt a different mindset, as
President Ronald Reagan did 35 years ago. Reagan won the presidency on
promises to rebuild US power, which he claimed had been declining
precipitously. In his first press conference as president, he shocked
the world with his depiction of the Soviet Union,
with which a détente had been emerging, as willing “to commit any
crime” to gain an advantage over America. He subsequently rejected the
international Law of the Sea Treaty; opposed the World Bank’s promotion
of energy conservation; withdrew the US from UNESCO; and, like Trump,
pledged to reduce America’s contributions to international
organizations.
But within a year or two, Reagan began to recognize just how badly the US needed international institutions, and he moderated
his positions. After the Latin American debt crisis began in 1982, for
example, the US financial system’s exposure to foreign banks became
starkly apparent, as did the vital role of the international financial
institutions in preserving that system’s stability.
This experience also
provides some insight into China’s position. As the country’s banks grow
– it already boasts four of the world’s five largest – it will need the
International Monetary Fund to enforce their international rights. More
broadly, China’s economy depends on economic globalization, which
requires global rules and enforcement mechanisms.
China’s leadership
ambitions and emphasis on rules may be good news. But it makes sense for
other countries to maintain some skepticism. To be sure, China has made
itself a major player in every region of the world, by deploying a
combination of trade, aid, and investment – in particular, by pursuing
major infrastructure investment projects in strategic locations
throughout the developing world, as part of its “one belt, one road”
strategy. But none of this has been an exercise in selflessness.
Of course, America’s
global leadership was never selfless, either. But it did largely
represent a kind of enlightened self-interest. So the real question may
be where both China and Trump’s US stand in the enlightenment process.
Enlightenment can
surely take time, as it did for Reagan. For now, Trump seems committed
to his deal-making approach to America’s relationships with other
countries, even longtime partners and allies like Mexico and Australia.
This is not bilateralism, which would involve respecting existing
treaties; it is literally deal-by-deal diplomacy. And it cannot work.
The US isn’t a
dictatorship, and diplomacy isn’t real estate. Personal deals made by a
president serving a four- or eight-year term can’t safeguard a
democracy’s interests. There must be continuity across presidencies,
with new leaders respecting the treaties signed by their predecessors. Pacta sunt servanda.
Trump’s deal-making
machine will soon hit hard constraints. Maybe this will enlighten him,
or maybe he’ll just get stuck. In any case, for now, we should expect
most countries to continue participating in existing international
agreements and institutions. But we should also maintain a healthy
skepticism about any great power seeking to use those arrangements to
its own advantage.
No comments:
Post a Comment