Shamiran Mako
On June 6th the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS), an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq, began an obstinate campaign to seize control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, in the Nineveh Province. By June 9th, a relatively small number of Islamic militants managed to not only occupy the city, but also drive out the city and province’s security forces, causing the mayor to flee to Erbil, along with an estimated 500,000 civilians currently attempting to seek refuge in the northern Kurdish-controlled provinces.
Less than a month into the chaos, ISIS has declared an Islamic caliphate in the territories it controls across Iraq and Syria as its forces continue their march toward Baghdad after having succeeded in capturing the strategic town of Baiji, which houses one of Iraq’s largest oil refineries, and Tikrit, a vitally strategic Sunni-Arab stronghold and the hometown of Iraq’s former dictator, Saddam Hussein. As a humanitarian crisis ensues, reports and images of mass summary executions of Shiite soldiers by ISIS jihadists reflect what can escalate into a perpetual conflict one that could spark a civil war as seen in neighboring Syria. Inflaming tensions are speculations of Kurdish independence as Peshmerga forces—which have not been integrated into the Iraqi army and operate independent of Baghdad—seized the opportunity to secure previously contested territories such as the strategic and multiethnic oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The procurement of these contested territories has been followed by calls for an independence referendum amid escalating chaos by Iraqi Kurdistan’s leader, Massoud Barzani.
As ISIS pushes toward Baghdad, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki failed to convince Parliament to declare a state of emergency as federal, regional, and provincial governments grapple with how to tackle the dual crisis of obliterating a relentless threat while simultaneously providing aid and protection for one of the most devastating and swift displacement crises since the 2003 invasion. This is all following mounting violence prior to the country’s elections on April 30th, which handed victory to Maliki’s State of the Law Coalition. In the months leading up to the vote, the country saw some of the deadliest violence since the American occupation, with an estimated 8,868 deaths in 2013 and more than 1,400 deaths between January and February of this year. More recently, figures from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq estimate a total of 2,427 civilian deaths and another 2,287 injured in acts of terrorism over the month of June alone.
Understanding this “quagmire” and the escalating political stalemate requires an exploration of the array of factors that have, particularly since the American-led occupation in 2003, produced a stagnating state. The narrative points to a deeply divided and irreconcilable society where various factors—including (a) Sunni discontent stemming from their marginalization from the political process, a Shiite-dominated Baghdad, and their loss of control over the state; (b) increasing Kurdish aggravation over oil production and distribution spats and unsettled territorial disputes; and (c) the disenfranchisement of smaller and less powerful ethno-religious minorities, namely the Assyrians, Yazidis, Turkmen, Shabacks, and Mandeans—combine to intensify Iraq’s deep-seated segmental cleavages.
But what country isn’t divided?
The concern over the salience of Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions shouldn’t obscure miscalculated measures taken by American and Iraqi state actors and ruling elites since 2003 that have fuelled the processes that are unfolding today. Likewise, the sectarianization of the region following the Arab Spring and Syria’s protracted civil war have turned ideological fears into material threats, as demonstrated by ISIS’s intention to integrate territory it controls in both Iraq and Syria.
Domestically, America’s commitment to creating a beaming democracy that would serve as a model to countries across the region failed at delivering on its promise. Beginning with Paul Bremer’s de-Baathification order, to the absence of an institutional mechanism that would reconcile grievances and group demands, America’s expedient state-building project for Iraq grossly underestimated the complex and battered society Saddam Hussein had so ruthlessly controlled. The alliance of former Sunni-Arab Baathist officers with ISIS in the recent siege of Mosul speaks to the failure to integrate and consolidate them into the post-2003 governing system. This has largely been due to the absence of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration mechanism that could ensure their integration (to the extent possible) rather than exclusion from post-Hussein Iraq. Consequently, eleven years since the invasion, Iraq is a state more deeply divided than it has ever been, with ethno-religious groups seeking co-optation rather than reconciliation and with political and ethnic entrepreneurs capitalizing on ethnic and sectarian cleavages. Fuelling this crisis is a perennial security vacuum created by an exogenous intervention and a botched state-building attempt by an occupying power. Thus, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in December 2011 effectively left a country in political, economic, and social turmoil with a weak security sector.
Equally damaging has been Maliki’s targeting of prominent Sunni-Arab politicians and his disinclination to govern inclusively and respond to Sunni and Kurdish demands and dissatisfaction with his party and government, which have cemented an increasingly divided political arena and society. Likewise, the reluctance of Sunni Arabs and Kurds to commit to an institutional solution to their political, economic, and social grievances, coupled with their disinclination to accept Shiite leadership has equally hampered the political process. Thus, the absence of national reconciliation and political figures able to handle the country’s range of problems—ethnic and communal fault lines, functioning institutions, protection for minority groups, lagging socioeconomic development, mounting corruption, and a crippled and failed security sector incapable of providing basic levels of order and stability—have collectively contributed to Iraq’s domestic instability. Support from regional actors attempting to carve out their niche in the power vacuum by fuelling a dichotomizing sectarian narrative has only aggravated these tensions.
Understanding Iraq today requires factoring in a multiplicity of variables. Placing blame isn’t only about pointing the finger. Rather, it is a matter of culpability and accountability—two variables absent from Iraq’s post-2003 political and governing trajectory. While the presence of salient group attachments (whether ethnic or sectarian) has always complicated governing Iraq as a pluralistic society, institutional solutions that could accommodate contending claims and grievances have never been fully implemented. Thus, without the presence of institutions capable of creating an accountable form of government, one that could perhaps create a fully representative governing council at the executive level, Iraq will continue to be a state in shambles. Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, institutional reconfiguration must also complement a change in the current political culture of ruling elites, since ultimately, the buck stops with Iraqis.
Shamiran Mako is a Carnegie Visiting Scholar of the Boston Consortium for Arab Region Studies at Northeastern University and an associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.
As ISIS pushes toward Baghdad, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki failed to convince Parliament to declare a state of emergency as federal, regional, and provincial governments grapple with how to tackle the dual crisis of obliterating a relentless threat while simultaneously providing aid and protection for one of the most devastating and swift displacement crises since the 2003 invasion. This is all following mounting violence prior to the country’s elections on April 30th, which handed victory to Maliki’s State of the Law Coalition. In the months leading up to the vote, the country saw some of the deadliest violence since the American occupation, with an estimated 8,868 deaths in 2013 and more than 1,400 deaths between January and February of this year. More recently, figures from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq estimate a total of 2,427 civilian deaths and another 2,287 injured in acts of terrorism over the month of June alone.
Understanding this “quagmire” and the escalating political stalemate requires an exploration of the array of factors that have, particularly since the American-led occupation in 2003, produced a stagnating state. The narrative points to a deeply divided and irreconcilable society where various factors—including (a) Sunni discontent stemming from their marginalization from the political process, a Shiite-dominated Baghdad, and their loss of control over the state; (b) increasing Kurdish aggravation over oil production and distribution spats and unsettled territorial disputes; and (c) the disenfranchisement of smaller and less powerful ethno-religious minorities, namely the Assyrians, Yazidis, Turkmen, Shabacks, and Mandeans—combine to intensify Iraq’s deep-seated segmental cleavages.
But what country isn’t divided?
The concern over the salience of Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions shouldn’t obscure miscalculated measures taken by American and Iraqi state actors and ruling elites since 2003 that have fuelled the processes that are unfolding today. Likewise, the sectarianization of the region following the Arab Spring and Syria’s protracted civil war have turned ideological fears into material threats, as demonstrated by ISIS’s intention to integrate territory it controls in both Iraq and Syria.
Domestically, America’s commitment to creating a beaming democracy that would serve as a model to countries across the region failed at delivering on its promise. Beginning with Paul Bremer’s de-Baathification order, to the absence of an institutional mechanism that would reconcile grievances and group demands, America’s expedient state-building project for Iraq grossly underestimated the complex and battered society Saddam Hussein had so ruthlessly controlled. The alliance of former Sunni-Arab Baathist officers with ISIS in the recent siege of Mosul speaks to the failure to integrate and consolidate them into the post-2003 governing system. This has largely been due to the absence of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration mechanism that could ensure their integration (to the extent possible) rather than exclusion from post-Hussein Iraq. Consequently, eleven years since the invasion, Iraq is a state more deeply divided than it has ever been, with ethno-religious groups seeking co-optation rather than reconciliation and with political and ethnic entrepreneurs capitalizing on ethnic and sectarian cleavages. Fuelling this crisis is a perennial security vacuum created by an exogenous intervention and a botched state-building attempt by an occupying power. Thus, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in December 2011 effectively left a country in political, economic, and social turmoil with a weak security sector.
Equally damaging has been Maliki’s targeting of prominent Sunni-Arab politicians and his disinclination to govern inclusively and respond to Sunni and Kurdish demands and dissatisfaction with his party and government, which have cemented an increasingly divided political arena and society. Likewise, the reluctance of Sunni Arabs and Kurds to commit to an institutional solution to their political, economic, and social grievances, coupled with their disinclination to accept Shiite leadership has equally hampered the political process. Thus, the absence of national reconciliation and political figures able to handle the country’s range of problems—ethnic and communal fault lines, functioning institutions, protection for minority groups, lagging socioeconomic development, mounting corruption, and a crippled and failed security sector incapable of providing basic levels of order and stability—have collectively contributed to Iraq’s domestic instability. Support from regional actors attempting to carve out their niche in the power vacuum by fuelling a dichotomizing sectarian narrative has only aggravated these tensions.
Understanding Iraq today requires factoring in a multiplicity of variables. Placing blame isn’t only about pointing the finger. Rather, it is a matter of culpability and accountability—two variables absent from Iraq’s post-2003 political and governing trajectory. While the presence of salient group attachments (whether ethnic or sectarian) has always complicated governing Iraq as a pluralistic society, institutional solutions that could accommodate contending claims and grievances have never been fully implemented. Thus, without the presence of institutions capable of creating an accountable form of government, one that could perhaps create a fully representative governing council at the executive level, Iraq will continue to be a state in shambles. Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, institutional reconfiguration must also complement a change in the current political culture of ruling elites, since ultimately, the buck stops with Iraqis.
Shamiran Mako is a Carnegie Visiting Scholar of the Boston Consortium for Arab Region Studies at Northeastern University and an associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.
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