Nina L. Khrushcheva
Nina L. Khrushcheva, the author of Imagining Nabokov: Russia Between Art and Politics and The Lost Khrushchev: A Journey into the Gulag of the Russian Mind,
is Professor of International Affairs and Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs at The New School and a senior fellow at the World Policy
Institu… read more
NEW
YORK – I hate agreeing with Vladimir Putin, even a little. Russia’s
president is dragging his country – the country of my birth – backwards,
and falsely argues that violating international law is somehow good for
Russians. But the hysterical response of Americans to the Kremlin’s
alleged efforts to influence the US presidential election has forced me
to look at things from Putin’s perspective.
To
be sure, the US intelligence agencies’ allegations that Russia purveyed
fake news and released hacked emails, in order to hurt Hillary
Clinton’s chances against Donald Trump, are not baseless. It is
certainly in Putin’s character to purloin secrets and create
disinformation; he was a KGB operative, after all.
Likewise,
the accusations that Putin is holding a dossier of compromising
material on Trump, though uncorroborated, also ring true. It would make
little sense for Russia to spare Trump, of all people, from its schemes.
And, beyond Trump, Republican Party leaders must know that if Russia
hacked the Democrats, their own servers must have been hacked, too.
Even
if the alleged dossier’s sensational details are not accurate, chances
are that Russia is holding at least some compromising business records,
or even Trump’s tax returns – information that Trump has worked very
hard to keep hidden from the American public. If Trump doesn’t play
nice, taking Russia’s side on issues ranging from NATO to Ukraine, he
will likely see his secrets laid bare, just as Clinton’s were.
The
US response to this prospect has been extreme. Those firmly in Trump’s
camp are willing to indulge the fragile bromance between Trump and
Putin, despite its obvious vulnerability to exploitation by both sides.
Others, including some senior Republicans, cite the recently released US
intelligence report
on Russia’s suspected interference in the election and demand stern
measures against Putin’s government, even though a new Cold War is
clearly in no one’s interest.
In
my view, the intelligence report itself was fundamentally problematic.
Full of conjecture and bias, the report is based on the argument that
Putin must be an enemy, because he doesn’t share Western values.
But how could he? Russia was never fully welcome in the Western world
order, much less able to participate in it on equal terms. That is why
Putin has sought to create his own international order.
In fact, in the early days of his presidency, Putin wanted
Russia to be part of Europe. But he was immediately confronted with
NATO’s expansion into the Baltic states. In 2006, then-President George
W. Bush’s administration announced plans to build a missile-defense
shield in Eastern Europe, in order to protect the Western allies against
intercontinental missiles from Iran. Russia viewed the plan – which
President Barack Obama went through with last year – as a direct threat, and a sign that calls for closer ties should be regarded with caution.
The
US has supported anti-Putin forces since 2008, but ramped up that
support in 2011, when Putin, then the prime minister, prepared to return
to the presidency. In 2013, the US cheered the protests in Ukraine that
ultimately ousted the pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych. But
while Yanukovych was undoubtedly a crook, the US supports plenty of
crooks. Its effort to deny Russia, or any other power, the right to
possess similarly odious factotums is pure hypocrisy.
Such
duplicity has pervaded US foreign policy. Bush’s war in Iraq was
launched on the basis of tendentious intelligence. For his part, Obama
supported the Arab Spring uprisings, but offered no pro-democratic
strategy – an approach that has led Libya to become a failed state,
Egypt to become even more dictatorial, and Syria to collapse into
nightmarish and protracted conflict. Meanwhile, the US National Security
Agency was spying on everyone, whether friend or foe.
The
US intelligence report asserts that Putin is seeking to undermine
liberal democracy. It seems clear, however, that his more immediate goal
is to expose the West’s double standards, thereby breaking down Western
barriers to his pursuit of Russian interests. If the US can behave so
badly without apology, Putin’s thinking goes, why should Russia be
denied its sphere of influence in, say, Ukraine?
For that matter, why shouldn’t Putin have attempted to help out Trump? Ukrainians campaigned
for Clinton, believing that she would advance their interests. It is
perfectly reasonable that Putin would back Trump, who had repeatedly
expressed admiration for his leadership, over Clinton, who had compared
him to Adolf Hitler. The notion that he shouldn’t take steps to protect
his interests is ideological partiality disguised as objectivity, and it
lends credence to Putin’s claims that the West is out to get him.
Don’t
get me wrong: despite its imperfections, the US remains a positive
force in the world. Indeed, it may well be the only strongly positive
force, along with the European Union, which should stop squabbling and
start curtailing megalomaniacal and illiberal leaders like Hungary’s
Putin-infatuated prime minister, Viktor Orban.
Moreover,
the prospect that their new president is in Putin’s pocket should
certainly be worrying to Americans. And the West’s policies toward
Russia – economic sanctions or military exercises in border countries
like Poland – are not necessarily wrong. What is wrong is that those
concerns and policies are driven largely by anger over Putin’s own
nationalism, rather than by a careful consideration of the diplomatic
and strategic milieu.
If
the US allows itself to become caught up in suspicion and conjecture
about Russian involvement in its recent election, it will most likely
find itself locked in an even more destructive confrontation with Putin.
Instead, the US should devise a sound, thoughtful, and measured
approach toward Russia – one that appeals to values not as propaganda,
but as the basis of a more straightforward and credible foreign policy.
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