Andrés Velasco
Andrés Velasco, a former presidential
candidate and finance minister of Chile, is Professor of Professional
Practice in International Development at Columbia University's School of
International and Public Affairs. He has taught at Harvard University
and New York University, and is the author of num… read more
MONTEVIDEO
– Out-of-control globalization has destroyed jobs, caused middle-class
incomes to stagnate, and deepened income inequality. In response, angry
voters are turning to populist politicians. Without a radical shift away
from liberal economic policies, populism will be unstoppable.
This narrative is simple and increasingly popular. It is also dead wrong.
Precisely
because populism – whether leftist (Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Podemos
in Spain) or rightist (Donald Trump in the United States, the National
Front in France) – is ugly, menacing, and destructive, its growing
strength calls for nuanced explanation. A weak grasp of causes will lead
to ill-conceived solutions – at which point populism truly may become
unstoppable.
One
problem with the emerging conventional wisdom is that it mixes three
sets of factors that should be kept separate for analytical and policy
purposes. Product-market deregulation and falling trade barriers belong
to what academics call microeconomics. Destabilizing international capital flows and self-defeating fiscal austerity (Exhibit A: the eurozone) are part of macroeconomics. Lower transport costs and new labor-saving technologies fall under the rubric of exogenous structural change. Lumping all three together as globalization only causes confusion.
This confusion was evident two months ago, when the International Monetary Fund published a piece
that was greeted as the final nail in the coffin of “neoliberalism” (an
empty label that can encompass whatever bugbear a critic wants to rail
against on that particular day). Yet the Fund was only saying what, at
this point, is pretty obvious. Unregulated international capital
movements can be destabilizing. Large inflows appreciate currencies,
reduce competitiveness, and destroy jobs; sudden outflows cause those
appreciated currencies to crash, bankrupting local financial
institutions and requiring costly bailouts at taxpayers’ expense.
Moreover,
added the Fund, fiscal austerity can backfire. Cutting useful
expenditures or raising distortionary taxes reduces the supply of goods.
It also shrinks overall demand, which is fine when the economy is
overheated, but devastating when the economy is depressed and a
liquidity trap (Exhibit B: the eurozone again) prevents monetary policy
from doing the heavy lifting. If growth slows enough, the ratio of
public debt to GDP can end up rising, despite austerity.
So
macroeconomic mistakes are costly – in terms of growth, jobs, and
income distribution. That’s the bad news. The good news is that, by
imposing intelligent capital controls (as Chile did in the early 1990s
and other countries have done since), an economy can enjoy the benefits
of free trade in goods and services with less destabilizing capital
mobility. For nearly a decade, the IMF has been acknowledging that
controls are a useful policy tool – a change of heart that I lauded back in 2011.
Likewise,
misguided fiscal austerity is neither unavoidable nor inextricably
linked to globalization – especially the smart kind that moderates
short-term capital movements. Closed economies also can have fiscal
crises, and open economies can avoid them if they follow the right
policies.
The key
is to be Keynesian throughout the economic cycle: pursuing expansionary
policies when growth is slow; tightening to reduce public debt (and
thus create room for future expansion) when activity is buoyant. Fiscal rules can help make such behavior politically palatable.
So
there is no need to throw out the baby of a liberal international
economic order with the bathwater of bad macroeconomic policy. Economies
open to foreign goods and technology can develop the tools to mitigate
volatility and defend jobs. Europe, laboring under a common currency, a
half-hearted banking union, and an unnecessarily tight fiscal policy,
has chosen to abandon those tools. That choice was neither preordained
nor one that the rest of the world should imitate.
The
other problem with the conventional wisdom’s simplistic link between
globalization and populism is that it gets the timing wrong. Whatever
the causes, average wages in the US have been stagnant since the 1970s. As Daniel Gros has pointed out,
the wage gap between highly educated workers and the rest has been
roughly constant in Europe (and declining in the United Kingdom) over
the last decade. And in countries like Belgium, France, and Spain, the
unemployment rate was at or above 10% for long periods in the 1980s and
1990s. But there was no outbreak of nativist populism back then, and
there is now. Why?
The
answer has everything to do with politics. And politics, as former US
House Speaker Tip O’Neill liked to say, is always local.
Elites
in Western countries discredited themselves by permitting the financial
excesses that helped trigger the Great Recession and by being slow –
particularly in Europe – to deal with the social consequences. Next they
underestimated the effect that unfettered migration and the perceived
weakening of the nation-state would have on the sense of “us” – the
people with whom we share a destiny and of whom we ask sacrifices (one
of which is paying taxes).
Harvard’s Ricardo Hausmann has pointed out
that the British choose to have four different football teams (England,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), even though having one united
team might keep them from losing to tiny Iceland, as England did in the
recent European Cup. No wonder, then, that – viewing the choice this way
– the UK opted for Brexit.
Now
Western political elites are making another mistake when – seemingly
cowed by the populists – they fail to mount a full-throated defense of
liberalism’s virtues. UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn’s pathetic
efforts on behalf of the “Remain” campaign ahead of the Brexit
referendum, and his inability (one might say unwillingness) to confront
the Brexiteers’ many untruths, is a case in point.
In
the 1930s, thinkers like John Maynard Keynes and political leaders like
Franklin Roosevelt, with brave and eloquent words still worth quoting,
discarded capitalism’s mindless orthodoxies in order to save the liberal
democratic order. One world war and tens of millions of deaths later,
they succeeded.
Today,
liberal democratic values are once again under siege, and the path
paved by Keynes and Roosevelt is still the only way out. We should
follow it
No comments:
Post a Comment