Revisit the ‘One-China Policy’

1. John R. Bolton @AmbJohnBolton

A closer US military relationship with Taiwan would help counter Beijing’s belligerence.

The People’s Republic of China sent its aircraft carrier, Liaoning, through the Strait of Taiwan early this month, at least in part responding to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s phone conversation congratulating President-elect Donald Trump.
That’s Beijing’s style: Make an unacceptable long-distance phone call, and an aircraft carrier shows up in your backyard. It is akin to proclaiming the South China Sea a Chinese province and constructing islands in international waters to house military bases; to declaring a provocative Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea; and to seizing Singaporean military equipment recently transiting Hong Kong for annual military exercises on Taiwan.

A demonstrator holds a sign in support of China during Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s stop-over after her visit to Latin America in Burlingame, California, U.S., January 14, 2017. REUTERS/Stephen Lam

 

It is high time to revisit the “one-China policy” and decide what America thinks it means, 45 years after the Shanghai Communiqué. Mr. Trump has said the policy is negotiable. Negotiation should not mean Washington gives and Beijing takes. We need strategically coherent priorities reflecting not 1972 but 2017, encompassing more than trade and monetary policy, and specifically including Taiwan. Let’s see how an increasingly belligerent China responds.
Constantly chanting “one-China policy” is a favorite Beijing negotiating tactic: Pick a benign-sounding slogan; persuade foreign interlocutors to accept it; and then redefine it to Beijing’s satisfaction, dragging the unwary foreigners along for the ride. To Beijing, “one China” means the PRC is the sole legitimate “China,” as sloganized in “the three no’s”: no Taiwanese independence; no two Chinas; no one China, one Taiwan. For too long, America has unthinkingly succumbed to this wordplay.
Even in the Shanghai Communiqué, however, Washington merely “acknowledges” that “all Chinese” believe “there is but one China,” of which Taiwan is part. Taiwanese public opinion surveys for decades have shown fewer and fewer citizens describing themselves as “Chinese.” Who allowed them to change their minds? Washington has always said reunification had to come peacefully and by mutual agreement. Mutual agreement hasn’t come in 67 years, and won’t in any foreseeable future, especially given China’s increasingly brutal reinterpretation of another slogan—“one country, two systems” in Hong Kong.
Beijing and its acolytes expected that Taiwan would simply collapse. It hasn’t. Chiang Kai-shek’s 1949 retreat was not a temporary respite before final surrender. Neither the Shanghai Communiqué nor Jimmy Carter’s 1978 derecognition of the Republic of China persuaded Taiwan to go gentle into that good night—especially after Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
Eventually Taiwan even became a democracy, with the 1996 popular election of Lee Teng-hui, the peaceful, democratic transfer of power to the opposition party in 2000, and further peaceful transfers in 2008 and 2016. So inconsiderate of those free-thinking Taiwanese.
What should the United States do now? In addition to a diplomatic ladder of escalation, we can take concrete steps helpful to U.S. interests. Here is one prompted by China’s recent impoundment of Singapore’s military equipment. Spoiler alert: Beijing will not approve.
America could enhance its East Asia military posture by increasing U.S. military sales to Taiwan and by again stationing military personnel and assets there, probably negotiating favorable financial terms. We need not approximate Douglas MacArthur’s image of Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” or renegotiate a mutual defense treaty. Basing rights and related activity do not imply a full defense alliance. Our activities would not be dissimilar to Singapore’s, although they could be more extensive. The Taiwan Relations Act is expansive enough to encompass such a relationship, so new legislative authority is unnecessary.
Some may object that a U.S. military presence would violate the Shanghai Communiqué, but the language of the Taiwan Relations Act should take precedence. Circumstances in the region are fundamentally different from 1972, as Beijing would be the first to proclaim. Nearby Asian governments would cite the enormous increase in Chinese military power and belligerence. Most important, effectively permanent changes in the Taiwan-China relationship have occurred, making much of the communiqué obsolete. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus—things thus standing—justifies taking a different perspective than in 1972.
Taiwan’s geographic location is closer to East Asia’s mainland and the South China Sea than either Okinawa or Guam, giving U.S. forces greater flexibility for rapid deployment throughout the region should the need arise. Washington might also help ease tensions with Tokyo by redeploying at least some U.S. forces from Okinawa, a festering problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship. And the current leadership of the Philippines offers little chance of increasing military and other cooperation there in the foreseeable future.
Guaranteeing freedom of the seas, deterring military adventurism, and preventing unilateral territorial annexations are core American interests in East and Southeast Asia. Today, as opposed to 1972, a closer military relationship with Taiwan would be a significant step toward achieving these objectives. If China disagrees, by all means let’s talk.