Wolfgang Ischinger
Wolfgang Ischinger, former German
Ambassador to the United States, is Chairman of the Munich Security
Conference and Professor for Security Policy and Diplomatic Practice at
the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
MUNICH
– Donald Trump’s presidency poses a stress test for Europe, for
transatlantic relations, and for the world as a whole. Indeed, in many
ways, Trump’s “America first” policy is defined by its opposition to the
internationalist US foreign policy of the past eight decades.
For starters, Trump
says that he trusts German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian
President Vladimir Putin equally. Does that imply that the United States
will pursue a policy of equidistance between the EU and the Kremlin?
It is not an idle question. Trump has made it obvious that established partnerships, alliances, rules, and protocols mean little to him.
In his tweets, he rants about the media, attacks independent judges,
targets individuals and companies, and belittles international
organizations.
But even if the US
under Trump is an unattractive ally for Europe, writing off the US as a
European partner – which some in Europe would like to do sooner rather
than later – would be a mistake.
For one thing, Europe
must not ignore the majority of Americans who didn’t vote for Trump.
The commitment of America’s civil society and the response of its
judiciary show Europeans that the US they know and hold in high regard
is no pushover. Instead of turning away from the US, we should cooperate
with Americans who remain committed to preserving the transatlantic
community of values. This includes members of the new administration who
have voiced their clear support for the transatlantic partnership and
continuity, to say nothing of Trump’s opponents – Democrats and
Republicans alike – in Congress.
Moreover, those who
favor cutting ties seem to believe that there are partners all over the
world just lining up to defend the liberal global order together with
Europe. The EU might agree with China that a new era of protectionism
would be harmful. But beyond that, they have little common ground. In
the long term, the liberal global order will endure only if supported by
both pillars of the transatlantic partnership.
Finally, calls for
Europe to become a strategic counterweight to the US are purely
aspirational; in reality, no such option exists. In the short and medium
term, Europeans cannot do without the US security guarantee. As a
result, we must work to convince the new administration of the
importance of a united and peaceful Europe.
Nonetheless, the mere
speculation about decoupling European security from the US is giving
rise to uncertainty, reflected in the emerging debate about a European –
or even German – nuclear bomb. It’s a sham debate, because it assumes
what must be questioned: Is it really in Europeans’ interest to cut the
cord proactively now, before we have even been presented with any
concrete US decisions that directly affect us?
Europe’s only good
option is to engage with the US administration as closely as possible –
which doesn’t mean playing down deeply worrying statements made by
Trump. When Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of Defense James
Mattis, and a number of US senators and House members visit the Munich
Security Conference this weekend, European delegates must make their
expectations vis-à-vis the US administration very clear to them.
Engaging and influencing is the kind of realpolitik that is necessary now, even if many Europeans may not like the idea.
This means
communicating, with utmost clarity, that the breach of vital European
interests would bring about a major transatlantic crisis. The worst-case
scenario for Europe is a US administration that pursues policies – for
example, active support for right-wing populists – aimed at bringing
about the disintegration of the EU. It is equally important to ensure
that any deal between Russia and the US does not come at Europe’s
expense. As for the nuclear agreement with Iran, the Trump
administration must be made aware that Europe will not go along with any
new sanctions if the US withdraws from the deal unilaterally.
Europe can and should
assert itself economically as well. If Trump really wants to introduce a
kind of origin-based tax to promote US-made goods, the EU could
threaten to do the same. Whether the issue is import taxes or the future
of Western sanctions against Russia, it is helpful to remember the
simple fact that Europe remains America’s most important market.
America’s trade volume with the EU is roughly 37 times higher than that
with Russia, with huge mutual direct investments locking in the
transatlantic partners’ interdependence.
Even if Trump rejects
such considerations, he should think twice about how far he wants to
push Europe. At a certain point, anti-Trump election campaigns in Europe
would probably be very successful; he will hardly be able to accomplish
his plans without strong and close partners in Europe – and certainly
not if he acts against Europe.
But, clearly, Europe
must now focus on itself. We do need to do more to bolster our own
security. While significant change is on the way, including increased
integration of Europe’s armed forces, the road toward a well-functioning
European defense union is long. And, in light of the precarious global
situation, Germany, in particular, must increase its efforts in foreign and defense policy and development aid.
The EU’s cohesion and
its internal and external security cannot be achieved at zero cost.
Avoiding budget deficits, as Germany is now seeking to do, will be of no
benefit to future generations if the price is the erosion of the main
foundation of our prosperity: a peaceful and prosperous Europe.
Instead
of waiting in fear of Trump’s next tweet, we Europeans should lay the
foundations for a Europe that is strong, capable of taking action, and
committed to Western values. From this position, we can assert our key
interests vis-à-vis the US with confidence. That is the best response
Europe can give.
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